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1. Introduction. 
This paper provides an empirical examination of the international propagation mechanism of 
US monetary policy shocks to global equity markets. The international dimensions of the 
Fede a  Re e e  (Fed) ac  a e been a topic of continuous scrutiny in the literature, as 
they carry direct implications for global portfolio allocations, as well as for monetary 
policymaking. The bulk of research to date has attempted to discern the determinants of 
ba  e e  reaction to US monetary policy shocks by conditioning the strength of the 
transmission, mainly, to the degree of c e  cross-border real and financial integration, 
and to the flexibility of their exchange rate (e.g., Ammer, Vega, and Wongswan, 2010; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Wongswan, 2009). The present study adds to the existing 
evidence by examining the extent to which local monetary policy stance determines the 
strength of US monetary policy international transmission.  
The present study builds on a long and extensive literature, which, typically, pursues a 
twofold objective. First, it attempts to establish the existence of international spillover effects, 
and second, it seeks to identify the determinants of the strength of these effects. Evidence on 
the nature of the relationship between US monetary policy and international equity returns is 
rather robust, with the bulk of evidence pointing to a significant inverse relationship between 
US monetary policy shocks and foreign stock prices.1 There is also evidence of a significant 
link between Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communications and international 
equities (Hayo, Kutan and Neuenkirch, 2010, 2012). D c e  ba  e e  eac  
to US monetary policy shocks and FOMC communications can reveal the extent to which US 
monetary policy can affect common and country-specific business cycle and asset price 
fluctuations (Lastrapes, 1998). The motivation for the second objective arises from ongoing 
                                                          
1 See Ammer et al., 2010; Bailey, 1990; Conover, Jensen, and Johnson, 1999; Craine and Martin, 2008; 
Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Hayo, Kutan and Neuenkirch, 2010, 2012; Hussain, 2011; Johnson and Jensen, 
1993; Lastrapes, 1998; Mann, Atra, and Dowen, 2004; Wongswan, 2009. 
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efforts to uncover the proper course of actions that a country must pursue in order to 
internalise the externalities associated with US monetary policy (Canova, 2005). To the best 
of our knowledge, this study is the first to test formally the implications of bringing into line 
("synchronising") local policy rates with that of the US for the strength of the US monetary 
policy transmission to global equities.  
The posited channels through which US monetary policy affects foreign  cash 
flows and discount rates can be complex, and the ultimate result on global equity prices is 
uncertain a priori. For instance, US monetary policy shocks can have significant inverse 
effects on global equity prices through their impact on the international interest rates, as the 
latter are used to discount foreign firms  future cash flows.2 Simultaneously, however, 
international interest rate adjustments  a   Fed s actions might pass 
through to exchange rates via uncovered interest rate parity, and also affect foreign  
cash flows by altering domestic goods  competitiveness. But the impact of these two channels 
on global equity prices can be offsetting, and their relative importance difficult to predict 
beforehand (Wongswan, 2009). In a similar vein, innovations to US monetary policy stance 
can also affect foreign equities because they may trigger global portfolio rebalancing due to 
changes in the relative returns of global assets (Lastrapes, 1998). Finally, to the extent that 
the developments in US asset markets and macroeconomic conditions are interrelated with 
those of global economies, US monetary policy can influence expectations about future 
returns in global assets through its impact on US economic activity (Lastrapes, 1998).  
Intuitively, we expect that c e  sensitivity to externalities associated with US 
monetary policy is more pronounced when their goods and financial markets are integrated 
with the rest of world. Furthermore, the nature of a c s exchange rate regime is often 
                                                          
2 The significance of this transmission mechanism is reinforced by evidence indicating that changes in foreign 
interest rates is a significant amplifier of US monetary policy shocks international transmission (Canova, 2005; 
Frankel, Schmukler, and Servén, 2004; Kim, 2001).  
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couched in discussions about the strength of the international financial transmission of US 
monetary policy, as it determines the extent to which local interest rates adjust to US 
monetary policy innovations (Frankel et al., 2004; Shambaugh, 2004). Against this 
background, most of the existing research attempts to operationalise an empirical exploration 
on this subject by conditioning the differential reactions of global equities to US monetary 
policy shocks to the differences in cross-border real and financial linkages, as well as to the 
flexibility of the exchange rate regime.  
In this context, a number of recent papers document that countries with a higher degree 
of real (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011) and financial 
(Bailey, 1990; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Wongswan, 2009) integration with the rest of 
the world are more sensitive to US monetary policy shocks. Other research focuses on the 
way foreign interest rates and exchange rates adjust to global interest rate shocks, and finds 
that equities of countries with flexible exchange rates respond in a less pronounced way to 
US monetary policy (Ammer et al., 2010; Bailey, 1990; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011). 
Other factors that can capture the strength of the international financial transmission of US 
monetary policy include the high degree of equity market  openness, level of development, 
riskiness, and the degree of a c s business cycle correlation with the US (Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2009; Wongswan, 2009).  
The feedback responses of local monetary policy to Fed s actions, however, can 
influence the strength of US monetary policy shocks transmission, and although this 
possibility has been acknowledged (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009), it has not been formally 
tested. The reported reaction of global equities, for instance, might not only be due to an 
unexpected change in US monetary policy, but also due to an adjustment of similar direction 
to the local monetary policy conditions. In this case, the ultimate impact of Fed s actions on 
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international equities would be more pronounced, as foreign stocks will also respond to the 
changes in local monetary policy conditions.  
The synchronisation of policy rates, however, can also reduce the strength of the 
transmission. A similar policy to that of the US, for instance, can cancel out US monetary 
policy induced exchange rate adjustments and, given that higher exchange rate volatility 
amplifies the impact of US monetary policy shocks on global equities (Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2009), narrow this transmission channel. This posited hypothesis is reinforced by 
existing evidence which asserts that foreign monetary policymakers use their interest rate 
policy to cancel out abrupt changes in exchange rates (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; McCallum, 
1994). Moreover, synchronisation of policy rates can also act as a form of signalling for 
increased monetary policy cooperation reducing equity risk premia and sensitivity to US 
monetary policy externalities. 
The analysis in the present study proceeds in three steps. First, in subsection 2.1 we 
explore the relationship between US monetary policy shocks and global equities. Using an 
event-study framework, consistent with the bulk of existing recent literature (Ammer et al., 
2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Wongswan, 2009), we 
capture the immediate effects of US monetary policy shocks on the daily stock returns of 35 
countries.  
Second, in subsection 2.2 we characterise the degree of monetary policy 
interdependence between the US and the countries in our sample, and we seek to identify the 
extent to which the strength o  e a a  e e  reaction to US monetary policy shocks 
hinges on the level of a country s monetary policy interdependence with that of the US. 
Although monetary policy coordination can materialise in different forms, in this study we 
consider the synchronisation of interest rate policies, similarly to Bergin and Jordà (2004) and 
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Shambaugh (2004). We consider two different definitions for the commonality of monetary 
policy conditions between the US and a foreign country in this study. The first is a time-
varying definition of commonality, based on the monthly indicators for countr e  monetary 
policy conditions (see Conover et al., 1999; Mann et al., 2004). We identify those countries 
which for a certain period share similar monetary policy conditions with the US. The second 
approach follows the technique developed by Bergin and Jordà (2004), and allows to identify 
those countries whose policy rate changes are more likely to move in the same direction with 
the Fed s policy rate.  
The third step, in subsection 2.3, consists in investigating how country-specific 
characteristics influence the strength of the international financial transmission of US 
monetary policy to the countries synchronising their policy rates with that of the US. In this 
context, we categorise countries according to the degree of their cross-border real and 
financial linkages as well to the flexibility of their exchange rates, and we analyse the 
differences. Finally, section 3 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The response of global equities to US monetary policy shocks. 
 
2.1. Baseline event-study results. 
We seek to identify the effects of US monetary policy shocks on global equity markets using 
a pooled regression-based event study approach. The event-study approach has been used 
extensively in the stream of research which seeks to identify the effects that FOMC 
announcements elicit on international stock market returns (see inter alia Ammer et al., 2010; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009). This approach provides the empirical framework for 
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identifying the average effects of FOMC announcement surprises on foreign stock returns. 
Moreover, it provides flexibility for capturing the differential response of global equities to 
US monetary policy shocks across different subsets of a given sample.  
The starting point of our analysis is the estimation of the following equation using 
panel data: 
 ijiij Scr ,1, HE  ,               (1) 
where rj,i is the daily (log) returns of c  j aggregate stock market price index on an 
FOMC meeting day i, and Si stands for the unexpected component of the monetary policy 
announcements calculated in a similar manner to Kuttner (2001). In a similar vein to the 
existing literature, we obtain ordinary least squares estimates for the average reaction of 
foreign stock market returns to monetary policy shocks. In addition to this we use the method 
of Petersen (2009) to calculate panel-corrected standard errors which are robust to two 
dimensions of within-cluster correlation. 
Our analysis covers 35 countries comprising of 30 OECD and 5 key partners to the 
OECD countries. In particular, we consider the following countries: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. We obtain 
aggregate stock market returns from the Datastream calculated price indices, expressed in 
national currencies, similarly to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009). 
Our sample, which extends from February 1994 to September 2008, allows considering 
118 scheduled FOMC announcements. On scheduled meeting days, most of the monetary 
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policy announcements take place at around 14.15 EST3, when the stock markets in Europe 
and Asia are closed. For these countries, therefore, we con de  e  ad  da s 
stock returns in order to estimate the contemporaneous effects of FOMC a ce e  
monetary policy shocks. We restrict our analysis to include FOMC announcements up to the 
end of 2008, when the Fed set the range of its target rate between 0 and 0.25, and started 
operating at the zero lower bound adopting unconventional monetary policy practices.  
-Table 1 here- 
The results from the estimation of Eq. (1) are reported in Table 1. The positive and 
statistically significant estimate for the intercept suggests that global equities  returns average 
value is positive on the 118 announcement days. Higher average returns on FOMC 
announcement days possibly reflect the higher equity premium demanded by investors in 
anticipation of scheduled monetary policy announcements (Savor and Wilson, 2013). Similar 
findings have been reported in previous related studies (e.g., Kurov, 2012; Wongswan, 2009). 
The results from the estimation of Eq. (1) also reveal a negative relationship between US 
monetary policy shocks and international stock market returns. Specifically, we find that a 25 
basis points surprise tightening (easing) in the US monetary policy rate will decrease 
(increase) foreign stock market prices by about 0.8%. This result is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies that employ similar event-study techniques to examine the 
impact of unexpected FOMC actions on daily returns of international aggregate stock market 
indices (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011). When, however, 
the intra-day response of global equities to US monetary policy shocks is considered, the 
international financial transmission of US monetary policy appears to be more pronounced 
                                                          
3 There are two occasions when the scheduled announcement of the FOMC action took place before noon 
(Lucca and Moench, 2015). These two cases refer to the FOMC meeting on February 4th 1994, when the 
announcement took place at 11:05, and the FOMC meeting on March 26th 1996, when the announcement took 
place at 11:39.     
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(Ammer et al., 2010; Wongswan, 2009). We also include in Eq. (1) a term capturing the 
anticipated component of US monetary policy announcements, calculated as the difference 
between the actual change  e Fed  a e and the unanticipated one (Kuttner, 2001). Our 
results, reported in Table 1, remain unaffected.     
Although the stronger reaction of international equities in the first minutes of a US 
monetary policy announcement might be due to a market overreaction, inaccurate results 
might also emerge when daily stock returns are employed to gauge the US monetary policy 
shocks effects on global equities (Thornton, 2013). Specifically, the accurate identification of 
the international transmission might be thwarted, because other news, unrelated to US 
monetary policy, occurring on the same day, both domestic and imported, might also affect 
asset prices. To control, therefore, for the robustness of our results from the estimation of Eq. 
(1), we employ Thornton s (2013) approach which controls for the possibility that the stock 
prices and the market-based proxies for monetary policy shocks respond simultaneously to 
news unrelated to US monetary policy without using intra-day data.  
This approach involves the estimation of the following equation:    
tj
ANN
t
ANN
ttttj SScr ,321, HEEE && ,           (2) 
where XANN is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 on days of FOMC announcements and 
zero otherwise, while t refers to all days in our sample and not just to the FOMC 
announcements days. The results from the estimation of Eq. (2) are reported in Table 1, and 
are also indicative of a significant US monetary policy international transmission channel. 
The coefficient estimate 2, ca  e a a  e e  add a  e e  US 
monetary policy shocks on days of FOMC announcements, is statistically significant and 
negative. Moreover, coefficient estimate 1 which measures the simultaneous response of 
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global equities and market-based measures for US monetary policy shocks is statistically 
insignificant.  
The benchmark specification of the event-study excludes monetary policy actions taken 
on unscheduled FOMC meetings. This is because the last tend to be associated with specific 
circumstances requiring an urgent response from the Fed (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). 
Consider for instance, the rate cut on September 17th 2001, which came as a response to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, and the rate cut on January 22nd 2008 (the largest in 20 years) in 
response to the deepening of the financial crisis. Such actions e ec  Fed  e es to 
extraordinary situations, and they are usually classified as 'outlier events' in related studies, 
c ea  e e  e e  e e (see for e.g., Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; 
Kontonikas, MacDonald & Saggu, 2013). 
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to examine if global equities respond in a different 
manner to monetary policy shocks emanating from unscheduled FOMC announcements. 
During the period from February 1994 until September 2008, 118 scheduled FOMC meetings 
and 6 unscheduled meetings occurred, excluding that on September 17th 2001. We estimate, 
therefore, the following equation:  
ij
UN
iiiij XSScr ,21, HEE  ,                       (3) 
where XUN is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 on unscheduled FOMC meeting 
days and i now includes both scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meeting days. The results 
from this regression (reported in Table 1) do not show a statistically significant marginal 
reaction of global equities to monetary policy shocks originating from unscheduled FOMC 
meetings. 
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The event-study framework adopted in this paper is based on the implicit assumption 
that monetary policy news is the only factor driving equity prices on FOMC announcement 
days. Similar daily or intra-day event-windows have also been employed in previous related 
studies (Ammer et al., 2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; 
Wongswan, 2009). The observed daily equity performance, however, might be due to a 
prolonged episode of increasing or decreasing equity prices in a country, which is unrelated 
to US monetary policy developments.4  
Thus, to address this possibility and its implications we also consider the relationship 
be ee  US e a  c  c  a d ba  e e  'abnormal' returns. Specifically, we 
adjust the daily equity returns of each country in our event study by subtracting the mean of 
their past performance over 3- and 5-days directly preceding the announcement day, and 
explore their association with US monetary policy surprises. The regression of global 
e e  abnormal returns on monetary policy surprises yields statistically insignificant 
reaction estimates, as we show in Table 1, and challenges existing evidence of a strong pass-
through of US monetary policy into global equities. We use this measure of equity 
performance in the remaining part of the paper to test if this average result holds for all 
subsets of the sample we are examining in this paper. 
 
2.2. The role of domestic monetary policy conditions.  
In this section, we seek to identify the extent to which monetary conditions in the non-US 
countries determine the cross-border differences in the impact of US monetary policy on 
global equities. We examine whether the commonality, or not, of the monetary policy 
conditions in the 35 countries from our sample with those of the US influence the strength of 
US monetary policy international pass-through into international stock markets. An important 
                                                          
4 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of analysis. 
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aspect of our analysis in this section is, therefore, the uncovering of the degree of a country s 
monetary policy interdependence with that of the US.  
First, in order to identify the degree of monetary policy interdependence between two 
countries we use the monthly indicators  c e  monetary policy environments 
employed in Jensen and Johnson (1995), Jensen et al. (1996), Conover et al. (1999), and 
Mann et al. (2004). Using this classification, the monetary policy environment of a country 
can be classified as either tightening or easing based on the most recent change in the policy 
a e. S ec ca , a c  e a  c  e e   c a ac e ed a  e c e 
after an increase in the policy rate, while the easing monetary phase starts after a policy rate 
cut. The assumption on which this binar  c a ca   a c  e a  c  
conditions rests is that monetary policy conditions remain unchanged until there is a reverse 
in the policy rate. In the present study, we relax this assumption, and we also consider a 
monetary policy inaction phase which starts on a month when a country has left its policy rate 
unchanged 12 consecutive times. The monetary policy environments of two countries are 
common when they share similar monetary policy conditions. In Table A.1 in the Appendix, 
we provide information about the policy rates used for each country, as well as for their 
availability. This approach has the advantage of allowing for a time-varying definition of 
commonality between the monetary policy of a country and that of the US.5  
The second approach we use in order to determine the degree of monetary policy 
interdependence between the US and each one of the countries from our sample is based on 
Bergin a d J d  (2004) directional model. Using an ordered probit model, this method 
seeks to identify whether US monetary policy rate changes affect the likelihood of changes in 
                                                          
5 In order to construct the monetary policy synchronisation dummy variable, we also use the original binary 
ec ca   a c  e a  c  a ce c  d e   c de  e e a  c  ac  e d 
(e.g., Conover et al., 1999 and Mann et al., 2004). We repeat the estimations in Tables 3 and 4, and our results 
are qualitatively similar. For brevity reasons we do not present these results, but they are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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similar direction in the policy rates of other countries. The model of Bergin and Jordà (2004), 
however, examines only whether c a e   e a e  c e  e a  licy rates are 
due to US monetary policy, and does not consider periods when the target countries  policy 
rates have not changed. This specification of the ordered probit model involves estimations in 
event time (the event is the change in the policy rate of the target country), rather than time 
series estimations, excluding consequently all those months when a target country did not 
adjust its policy rate.  
In order to consider periods of monetary policy inactivity, we depart from the original 
specification of Bergin and Jordà (2004), and we consider ordered probit estimations in a 
time series setting including all months from February 1994 to September 2008. Based on the 
assumption that central banks adjust their policy rates in discrete increments, we categorise 
each policy rate adjustment of a central bank (Δr) in five broad categories: strong decrease 
(k1), decrease (k2), inactivity (k3), increase (k4), and strong increase (k5). Thus, we include an 
additional category to capture the months when no policy rate changes have taken place. 
Conditional to the variability of the policy rate changes in each country during the period 
under consideration, we classify the policy rate changes into these five categories. In 
particular, for each country we use the classification system shown in Table A.1 of the 
appendix. For instance, the values that a US monetary policy rate adjustment can take are k1 = 
-0.5%, k2 = -0.25%, k3 = 0%, k4 = 0.25%, and k5 = 0.5%, while those of Mexico are k1 = -
0.75%, k2 = -0.25%, k3 = 0%, k4 = 0.25%, and k5= 0.75%.  
Based on this classification, we can have for each country 5 different occurrences in 
every month t. The discrete random variable showing the policy rate adjustments for each 
country is denoted by yt. The ordered response model proposed by Bergin and Jordà (2004) 
takes the following form:   
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where εt ~ N(0,1), *ty  is a latent continuous variable, and the threshold parameters of this 
ordered choice model cm, m = 0,1,2,3,4,5 are such that f  f 543210 cccccc . 
The vector of explanatory variables tw c de  e : e e  ea  e ec ed 
a  a e  2% (C e  Ec c ), e e  ea  e ec ed  d e c 
product growth minus 2.5% (Consensus Economics), the monthly percentage change in a 
country s effective exchange rate (BIS Nominal Broad Indices), and the discrete random 
variable USty  capturing US monetary policy rate adjustments. All variables in vector tw are of 
monthly frequency, and are included in Eq. (4) in lagged form to capture the information set 
available in the month just before the tth month ( 1:t ). Contrary to the original specification 
of Bergin and Jordà (2004), we use forward-looking data for inflation and real economic 
activity in our estimations of the ordered probit model, as they reflect more accurately the 
forward-looking nature of monetary policy.  
-Table 2 here- 
We estimate Eq. (4) for each one of the 35 countries in our sample, and we report the 
results in Table 2. For countries participating in the Eurozone, we estimate Eq. (4) separately 
 eac  c  c  a e  e e d be e Ja a  1999. A e  e d c   
the euro in January 1999, we consider the relationship between US monetary policy rate and 
the policy rate set by the European Central Bank. Our results show that for 14 out of 35 
countries, as well as all for the Euro area after January 1999 the reaction estimate of yt to the 
discrete US monetary policy rate adjustments USty is positive and statistically significant. That 
is, the central banks under consideration are more likely to adjust their policy rates in the 
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same direction as the US policy rate, and, thus, these countries are more likely to have similar 
monetary policy conditions with the US.6 
To get a better sense of the magnitude of the impact of US monetary policy on the 
probability of each occurrence of yt, we show, in Table A.2 in the appendix, the marginal 
effects of USty for those countries which we find from the estimations of Eq. (4) to be more 
likely to adjust their policy rates in the same direction as the Fed. The signs of the marginal 
effects are consistent with those obtained from the coefficient estimates, as a unit increase (25 
basis points of the US monetary policy rate) in USty dec ea e  e b    
dec ea e  a d dec ea e   e  c  a e , while it increases the possibility of 
c ea e  a d  c ea e . US monetary policy rate adjustments increase and/or 
decrease the probability of most outcomes of the discrete random variable yt, but they appear 
 e e a e a a e  ac   e c e   c ea e  a d dec ea e . T e only 
exceptions are Slovenia and the Republic of Korea where we find that they are associated 
   dec ea e  and c ea e  e ec e . 7  
The equation by which we assess how the synchronisation of local monetary policy rates 
with that of the US impacts on the strength of the baseline relationship in Eq. (1), is 
ij
SYN
ijiiij XSScr ,,21, HEE  ,            (5)  
where XSYN is a binary dummy variable taking the value of 1 if country j at time i has the 
same monetary conditions with the US, and zero otherwise. Based on the analysis above, the 
policy rates synchronisation dummy variable XSYN can take two definitions. First, we use the 
                                                          
6 We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to include the months when policy rates were left 
unchanged and for suggesting the use of forward-looking data in wt. 
7 We have also employed the original specification of Bergin and Jordà (2004) in order to identify the countries 
which are more likely to adjust their monetary policy rates in a similar direction to that in the US. This exercise 
is conducted in event time and the explanatory variables in vector wt are backward looking. When we repeat the 
estimations in Tables 3 and 4 using these countries our results are qualitatively similar. For brevity reasons these 
results are not included here, but are available from the authors upon request.  
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time-varying definition of commonality and XSYN takes the value 1 on event days i when the 
monetary policy conditions in country j, defined using an adaptation of the method of 
Conover et al. (1999) and Mann et al. (2004), are similar to those in the US, and zero 
otherwise. Second, it takes the value of 1 for those countries whose policy rates are more 
likely to respond in the same direction as the Fed s policy rate that we have identified using 
the directional model of Bergin and Jordà (2004) described above.  
-Table 3 here- 
Table 3 reports results from the estimation of Eq. (5), and show that on average, and 
irrespective of which monetary policy synchronisation definition we use, when foreign 
countries  monetary policy rates are in synch with the US policy rate, the impact of US 
monetary policy shocks on global equity markets tends to be on average less pronounced. 
Specifically, the coefficient estimates 2 capturing the marginal response of equities in 
countries whose monetary policy rate moves in tandem with that of the US is positive and 
statistically significant. In addition, after the interactive term of surprises with the monetary 
policy synchronisation dummy is included, the magnitude of the international equities  
reaction estimate 1 increases.  
In Table 3 we also show the results from Eq. (5) when abnormal returns are employed, 
and our results are comparable to those obtained when the reaction of daily returns is sought. 
In this section, therefore, we show that there is a significant negative relationship between 
global equities returns (and abnormal returns) and US monetary policy shocks on FOMC 
announcement days, unless foreign monetary policy rates are in synch with the US monetary 
policy rate. In that case the impact is less pronounced or even completely diminished as the 
results from testing if the sum of coefficients 1 and 2 is zero, reported in Table 3, depict.  
2.3 The role of other forms of interaction among countries  
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In the previous section, we have shown that the synchronisation of domestic monetary policy 
rates with that of the US reduces on average, and even diminishes, the strength of the 
international transmission of US monetary policy shocks to global equities. In the subsequent 
part, we proceed to investigate if this result is robust across all countries sharing similar 
monetary policy conditions with the US. In particular, we investigate if other forms of 
interaction between a country and the rest of the world can explain why the strength of the 
transmission channel is reduced in countries with similar monetary policy conditions to those 
in the US. The factors we consider are the cross-border real and financial linkages of a 
country, as well as the flexibility of its exchange rate. 
To uncover if the muted reaction of ba  c   Fed s unexpected actions can be 
pinned down to specific countries which share some similar characteristics along with 
synchronised policy rates with the US, we augment Eq. (5) by adding 3 interactive terms as 
follows:   
ij
HIGH
ij
SYN
iji
MED
ij
SYN
iji
LOW
ij
SYN
ijiiij XXSXXSXXSScr ,,,4,,3,,21, HEEEE  .    (6) 
XLOW, XMED, XHIGH are 0-1 dummy variables, which have been developed in the spirit of  
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009). Each one picks up the marginal reaction of the equities of 
the one third of the countries from our sample which at event time i they have the lowest, 
medium and highest values of the proxy for cross-border real and financial linkages and for 
the exchange rate flexibility, respectively. Detailed information regarding the way the 
dummy variables have been developed can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.  
To start with, we examine if the less pronounced impact under monetary policy 
synchronisation hi e   e de ee  a c s real economic integration with the world. 
The total a   a c s trade (exports plus imports) as well as the total exports to the 
US as a percentage to its GDP are the two measures employed to proxy for the degree of a 
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country s real economic linkage with the rest of the world and the US. Coefficient estimate 2 
reflects the marginal reaction of equities in countries which have synchronised their monetary 
policy rate with the US target rate, but also with a lower degree of real integration with the 
rest of the world. Coefficient estimate 4 shows the marginal reaction of equities in countries 
both having synchronised policy rates with the US and high cross-border real linkages with 
the rest of the world. Coefficient estimate 3, finally, shows the partial reaction of equities in 
counties with synchronised policy rates with the US and an intermediate degree of real 
economic integration.   
-Table 4- 
Table 4 reports results from the estimation of Eq. (6). The choice of the synchronisation 
dummy appears to influence our results to some extent. When the time-varying definition of 
monetary policy rates synchronisation is employed (see panel A of Table 4), the positive 
marginal impact of the monetary policy synchronisation dummy is identifiable to countries 
captured under the XHIGH and XMED categories. On the contrary, when the directional model of 
Bergin and Jordà's (2004) is employed to identify countries whose policy rates are in synch 
with that of the US (see panel B of Table 4), the on average reduced responsiveness of 
foreign stocks to US monetary policy shocks is also seen for countries with low exports to the 
US. The e  e de ee  a c  ea  ec c e a   e e   e d 
in the strength of the results from Eq. (5) is therefore, unclear.  
In part (b) of Table 4, we report the results from the estimation of Eq. (6) only that now 
dummy variables XLOW, XMED and XHIGH categorise countries according to their degree of 
financial integration with the world and the US at event day i. Specifically, we condition the 
magnitude of the policy rates synchronisation dummy to the amount of global financial assets 
that a country is exposed to. Following Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) we focus on asset and 
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liability holdings of the banking sector, on foreign direct investments and on portfolio 
investments (equity and debt instruments). Moreover, we consider the amount of a c  
US equity holdings as a percentage of their domestic stock market capitalisation. Although 
most of these indicators are highly correlated, and, therefore, they should not be expected to 
produce different results, it is typical in this literature to employ several indicators for cross-
border real and financial linkages for reasons of robustness (e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Wongswan, 2009).   
Although there are some differences in the results based on which policy rates 
synchronisation dummy variable we employ, a common pattern emerges. Monetary policy 
rates synchronisation dampens US monetary policy pass-through into global equity markets 
only for countries with at least an intermediate level of financial integration with the rest of 
the world and the US. When the time-varying definition of monetary policy rates 
synchronisation is employed (see panel A of Table 4), only the estimates for countries which 
at event time i have an intermediate ( 3) and high level ( 4) of financial integration with the 
rest of the world (and the US) appear to be statistically significant. For the countries in our 
sample whose policy rates are more likely to respond in the same direction to Fed s policy 
rate changes (see panel B of Table 4), we find similar results only that now the amount of a 
c  e d   e US a d  e   e e   e US d   ee   be 
relevant factors influencing our results from the estimation of Eq. (5).  
Finally in part (c) of Table 4, we report the results from the estimation of Eq. (6) where 
we control for the de ee  a c s exchange rate flexibility. This study uses two proxies 
for the exchange rate flexibility, one based on the de facto classification of Ilzetzki, Reinhart, 
and Rogoff (2010), and the other one on the actual exchange rate volatility. Based on our 
results for both monetary policy rates synchronisation dummies, e c s de facto 
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exchange rate regime does not appear to be a significant factor driving our results from the 
estimation of Eq. (5). As for the actual exchange rate volatility, we find that muted reactions 
under policy rates synchronisation coincide with intermediate levels of exchange rate 
volatility. Based on this result, countries with very volatile exchange rates cannot internalise 
the externality of US monetary policy shocks simply by synchronising their policy rates with 
the US. We also repeat the estimations of Eq. (6) in Table 4 using abnormal returns instead of 
daily (log) returns, but this does not change our main results.8  
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to identify empirically the extent to which local monetary policy 
conditions tend to influence the magnitude of the US monetary policy propagation to global 
equity markets. Although previous related studies hinted to this question (Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2009), to the best of our knowledge, it has not been formally tested yet. The main 
finding of this paper is that local monetary policy conditions are an important factor driving 
the strength of the US monetary policy transmission to global equities. In particular, we find 
that the strength of the transmission appears to be less pronounced, and even disappears, if a 
country s policy rates are synchronised with that of the US.  
The empirical analysis is pursued in the context of an event-study framework using a 
sample of 35 OECD countries and key partners of them. The empirical evidence we produce 
cover the period 1994-2008, during which took place 118 scheduled FOMC announcements. 
A central aspect of the analysis of this paper is the uncovering of the de ee  a c s 
monetary policy interdependence with that of the US, and we have used two techniques to 
address this issue. First, based on the monthly indicators of a c  monetary policy 
                                                          
8 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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stance developed by Conover et al. (1999) and Mann et al. (2004), we find those countries 
which share similar monetary policy conditions with the US at each event time. Second, 
based on the ordered response model of Bergin and Jordà (2004), we find those countries 
which are more likely to adjust their policy rates in a similar direction to the Fed. Our results 
suggest that equity markets of countries sharing similar monetary policy conditions with the 
US are less sensitive to US monetary policy shocks.  
Furthermore, we measure the extent to which the results about the moderated impact 
under monetary policy synchronisation are conditional to countries  degree of cross-border 
linkages in goods and financial markets as well as to the flexibility of their exchange rates. 
We find that monetary policy rates synchronisation does not reduce equities  reaction to US 
monetary policy shocks in countries segmented from global financial markets or with very 
volatile exchange rates.  
The findings of this paper underscore the significance of non-US monetary policy in the 
strength of the transmission of US monetary policy to global equities. Based on the empirical 
evidence presented in this paper, it is hard to tell why the synchronisation of monetary policy 
rates with that of the US reduces the overall strength of the transmission. The findings of this 
paper, however, may be useful in further studies as a means for understanding the 
determinants of the strength of the international propagation mechanism of US monetary 
policy. Furthermore, our findings may have policymaking implications, as they cast some 
light in the ways a country can use its monetary policy rate to internalise the externalities 
associated with US monetary policy shocks.      
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TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
GLOBAL EQUITY RETURNS AND US MONETARY POLICY SURPRISES 
 c Si Ei 
ANN
tX    ANNtt XS u  UNii XS u  R2 (%) Obs. 
rj,i 
0.19*** 
(3.09) 
-3.11** 
(-2.08) - - - - 1.42 4,086 
rj,i 
0.19*** 
(2.93) 
-3.19** 
(-2.08) 
0.44 
(1.48)    1.94 4,086 
rj,i 
0.02** 
(2.08) 
0.55 
(1.24) - 
0.17*** 
(2.63) 
-3.67** 
(-2.36) - 0.12 133,170 
rj,i 
0.23*** 
(3.61) 
-3.07** 
(-2.05) - - - 
1.58 
(0.77) 1.85 4,363 
days
ijr
3
,  
0.16** 
(2.30) 
-2.06 
(-1.14) - - - - 0.50 4,086 
days
ijr
5
,  
0.18** 
(2.52) 
-2.28 
(-1.30) - - - - 0.63 4,086 
NOTES: In the first row of this table, we report results from the estimation of Eq. (1), which is a pooled regression of daily returns (r) 
of 35 global equity price indices on the market-based proxy for US monetary policy shocks (S) on the 118 event days described in the 
main body of the text. In the second row we also include in Eq. (1) variable Ei which stands for the anticipated component of a US 
monetary policy announcement. In the third row of this table, we show results from the estimation of Eq. (2), which now includes in 
the pooled regression all days from January 3rd 1994 to September 30th 2008, and XANN is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 
on FOMC announcement days, and zero otherwise. The fourth row of this table shows the results from the estimation of Eq.(3), which 
now includes both scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meetings announcements, and XUN is 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 
on unscheduled FOMC meetings announcements, and zero otherwise. In the fifth and sixth rows of this table we show the results from 
the estimation of Eq. (1), where r3-days and  r5-days are the daily equity returns of each country on the 118 announcement days adjusted 
by subtracting the mean of their past performance over 3- and 5-days directly preceding the announcement day, respectively. 
Coefficient estimates are obtained by the OLS method, and t-statistics (.) are calculated using the two-dimensional clustered standard 
errors of Petersen (2009). 
 
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
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TABLE 2  
MONETARY POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE WITH THE US 
Country Inflation Growth Eff. XR  US MP Log.Lik. Pseudo R2 Obs. 
Australia 0.51*** (0.19) 
0.44 
(0.28) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
1.11** 
(0.54) -114.17 9.27 175 
Austria -5.02*** (1.45) 
3.24** 
(1.29) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
-0.21 
(1.34) -15.42 47.85 58 
Belgium -2.10** (0.82) 
0.57 
(0.76) 
0.22 
(0.28) 
0.23 
(1.33) -26.42 16.36 58 
Brazil 0.06 (0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-1.48*** 
(0.49) -196.33 3.40 146 
Canada -0.29 (0.37) 
0.63*** 
(0.19) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
1.47*** 
(0.47) -198.06 7.38 175 
Chile 0.03 (0.08) 
0.25** 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
1.07** 
(0.47) -145.62 4.52 161 
China -0.09** (0.04) 
0.46*** 
(0.16) 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
0.91 
(0.69) -75.61 7.24 165 
Czech Rep. -0.03 (0.05) 
0.69*** 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
0.50 
(0.55) -123.74 15.16 153 
Denmark 0.38 (0.42) 
-0.81** 
(0.36) 
-0.05 
(0.14) 
2.46*** 
(0.54) -131.14 8.44 172 
Finland .007 (0.74) 
-0.15 
(0.81) 
-0.04 
(0.17) 
2.61 
(2.32) -15.87 5.18 58 
France -2.79*** (0.99) 
12.34*** 
(3.21) 
0.25 
(0.30) 
-1.51 
(1.44) -17.65 62.13 58 
Germany -3.45** (1.52) 
3.61*** 
(1.38) 
-0.16 
(0.23) 
-1.12 
(1.34) -16.72 43.44 58 
Greece 0.22 (0.20) 
1.07 
(1.21) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.59 
(1.24) -47.22 3.28 58 
Hungary -0.08*** (0.03) 
-0.33*** 
(0.12) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.55 
(0.49) -163.86 3.91 164 
India -0.06 (0.07) 
0.24 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
0.24 
(0.72) -59.52 3.98 165 
Indonesia 0.49** (0.20) 
0.74 
(1.01) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(1.12) -48.19 6.26 39 
Ireland -1.07 (0.95) 
-0.01 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
2.46* 
(1.29) -32.90 10.97 58 
Israel -0.09** (0.03) 
0.34*** 
(0.11) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.87* 
(0.47) -217.7 4.27 165 
Italy 0.59** (0.26) 
0.97* 
(0.59) 
-0.21** 
(0.11) 
-0.18 
(1.26) -28.62 21.20 58 
Japan -0.05 (0.38) 
0.26 
(0.27) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
0.20 
(0.84) -42.85 4.81 175 
Luxembourg -0.44 (0.54) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.30 
(0.45) 
-1.48 
(1.41) -26.51 5.04  
Mexico -0.05*** (0.01) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
1.09** 
(0.44) -249.92 5.54 175 
Netherlands -2.78* (1.52) 
3.18*** 
(0.82) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
0.96 
(1.25) -36.41 23.14 58 
New Zealand 0.44 (0.45) 
0.89** 
(0.42) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
2.18*** 
(0.63) -91.81 10.35 114 
Norway 0.41* (0.21) 
0.43*** 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.66 
(0.50) -147.84 5.28 175 
Poland -0.20*** (0.05) 
0.92*** 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.82 
(0.58) -120.66 13.94 127 
Portugal -0.02 (0.17) 
0.92 
(0.76) 
-0.48* 
(0.27) 
2.52** 
(1.05) -70.03 5.93 58 
Korea, Rep. 0.43 (0.64) 
-0.10 
(0.22) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
1.24* 
(0.74) -63.46 4.94 111 
Slovenia -0.07 (0.15) 
1.07 
(0.98) 
-0.08 
(0.41) 
2.14* 
(1.17) -54.70 6.81 83 
-continued in the next page - 
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TABLE 2  
MONETARY POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE WITH THE US 
-continued from previous page- 
Country Inflation Growth Eff. XR  US MP Log.Lik. Pseudo R2 Obs. 
South Africa 0.07 (0.05) 
0.69*** 
(0.15) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
0.29 
(0.48) -160.80 8.66 175 
Spain 0.83*** (0.26) 
1.81*** 
(0.52) 
-0.20 
(0.20) 
2.71** 
(1.08) -56.01 17.36 58 
Sweden 0.76*** (0.16) 
1.50*** 
(0.26) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.48) -144.71 14.67 175 
Switzerland -0.86*** (0.31) 
0.35 
(0.50) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
1.42** 
(0.59) -98.76 6.71 175 
Turkey .002 (0.01) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.32 
(0.49) -241.17 0.14 162 
U.K. 0.14 (0.14) 
0.66*** 
(0.21) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
2.36*** 
(0.51) -134.57 13.70 175 
Euro Area 1.77*** (0.67) 
0.49* 
(0.27) 
-0.21 
(0.10) 
2.66*** 
(0.70) -71.94 16.09 116 
NOTES: This table reports results from the estimation of the ordered probit model of Eq. (4). The dependent variable 
captures the magnitude and direction of a country's policy rate adjustment on month t, and can take 5 different values 
( strong decrease , decrease , inactivity , increase , strong increase ), as described in the main body of the text. The 
independent variables are lagged, and are the following: Inflation stands for e e  ea  e ec ed a  rate minus 
2% (Consensus Economics), Growth  e e  ea  e ec ed  d e c d c    2.5% (C e  
Economics), Eff. XR for the monthly percentage change in a country's effective exchange rate, and US MP is the discrete 
random variable yUS showing the magnitude and direction of the US monetary policy rate adjustment. For countries 
participating in the Eurozone, we estimate Eq. (4) e a a e   eac  c  c  a e  e e d be e Ja a  
1999. After the introduction of the euro in January 1999, we consider the relationship between US monetary policy rate and 
the policy rate set by the European Central Bank. For Luxembourg for the period before 1999 we use the policy rate set by 
the National Bank of Belgium. In the parentheses (.) we report the standard errors of the coefficient estimates.  
 
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
MONETARY POLICY RATE SYNCHRONISATION 
 Si   
SYN
iji XS ,u  
H0: 1+ 2=0 
[p-value] R
2 (%) Obs. 
Panel A: Time-varying synchronisation 
rj,i 
-4.89** 
(-2.35) 
3.13* 
(1.78) 
[0.19] 
2.08 3,771 
days
ijr
3
,  
-4.22* 
(-1.70) 
4.09* 
(1.86) 
[0.94] 1.12 3,771 
days
ijr
5
,  
-4.32* 
(-1.89) 
3.91* 
(1.92) 
[0.82] 1.21 3,771 
Panel B: Directional model synchronisation  
rj,i 
-4.90*** 
(-4.17) 
2.45** 
(1.99) 
[0.00] 1.94 3,736 
days
ijr
3
,  
-3.61*** 
(-3.96) 
2.44** 
(2.35) 
[0.10] 0.73 3,736 
days
ijr
5
,  
-3.84** 
(-3.69) 
2.67** 
(2.37) 
[0.07] 0.85 3,736 
NOTES:  In this table, we report results from the estimation of Eq. (5). XSYN is a 0-1 dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 on days when the monetary policy conditions in a country are 
similar to those in the US, and zero otherwise. In Panel A, we report the results when XSYN is 
constructed using the time- a  de   a c  e a  c  c d ons. 
Specifically, the monetary policy conditions in a country are tightening (easing) for a period 
which starts on a month with a policy rate hike (cut) and continues until there is a rate cut (hike), 
while after 12 months of unchanged policy rates we assume a period of monetary policy 
inactivity. In panel B, XSYN takes the value of 1 for those countries which are more likely to adjust 
their policy rates in the same direction as the US policy rate, identified by Bergin and Jordà s 
(2004) model described in the main body of the text. In column [p-value], we report the level of 
significance for the null hypothesis: H0: 1+ 2=0. Coefficient estimates are obtained by the OLS 
method, and t-statistics (.) in Panel A are calculated using the two-dimensional clustered standard 
errors of Petersen (2009), while in Panel B we report bootstrap t-statistics.  
 
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively.  
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TABLE 4 
OTHER FACTORS OF INTERACTION 
Panel A: Time-varying synchronisation 
 Si  Coefficient t-stat H0: 1+ 2/3/4=0 [p-value] R
2 (%) Obs. 
(a) real integration proxies 
Trade 
 (row) 
-5.89** 
(-2.35) 
(1) XHIGH 4.06* (1.89) [0.59] 
2.13 3,771 (2) XMED 3.09 (1.44) [0.32] 
(3) XLOW 2.23 (1.52) [0.06] 
        
Exports to 
US 
-5.06** 
(-2.36) 
(1) XHIGH 4.59** (2.28) [0.76] 
2.26 3,691 (2) XMED 3.98* (1.71) [0.63] 
(3) XLOW 1.64 (0.91) [0.00] 
        
(b) financial integration proxies 
Bank -4.89** (-2.35) 
(1) XHIGH 4.07* (1.74) [0.64] 
2.16 3,771 (2) XMED 3.31 (1.55) [0.37] 
(3) XLOW 1.59 (0.70) [0.16] 
        
Lending 
from US 
-5.20* 
(-1.95) 
(1) XHIGH 3.70 (1.40) [0.41] 
1.83 3,057 (2) XMED 5.05** (2.45) [0.93] 
(3) XLOW 3.00 (1.05) [0.34] 
        
FDI -5.19** (-2.23) 
(1) XHIGH 4.39* (1.90) [0.65] 
2.50 3,379 (2) XMED 4.60** (2.05) [0.71] 
(3) XLOW 1.55 (0.61) [0.13] 
        
FDI  
(US stock) 
-4.98** 
(-2.40) 
(1) XHIGH 4.59** (2.26) [0.80] 
2.39 3,654 (2) XMED 4.28* (1.92) [0.73] 
(3) XLOW 1.10 (0.58) [0.01] 
        
Portfolio 
Equity 
-4.98** 
(-2.35) 
(1) XHIGH 3.82* (1.70) [0.55] 
2.39 3,771 (2) XMED 4.85** (2.16) [0.98] 
(3) XLOW -0.06 (-0.05) [0.00] 
        
Portfolio 
Debt 
-4.89** 
(-2.35) 
(1) XHIGH 4.04* (1.67) [0.67] 
2.26 3,771 (2) XMED 3.95* (1.84) [0.60] 
(3) XLOW 0.40 (0.21) [0.01] 
        
US equity 
investment 
-6.44* 
(-1.79) 
(1) XHIGH 7.93** (2.40) [0.43] 
3.86 2,044 (2) XMED 10.51*** (2.94) [0.03] 
(3) XLOW 3.49 (0.86) [0.34] 
        
(c) Exchange rates flexibility 
        
XR Regime 
Classification 
-4.90** 
(-2.34) 
(1) XFLEX 2.32 (1.46) [0.07] 2.11 3,762 (2) XFIXED 3.70 (1.59) [0.52] 
        
XR Volatility -4.73** (-2.11) 
(1) XHIGH -1.34 (-0.53) [0.01] 
2.19 3,552 (2) XMED 4.79*** (2.65) [0.98] 
(3) XLOW 2.98 (1.43) [0.31] 
Panel B: Directional model synchronisation 
(a) real integration proxies 
Trade 
(row) 
-4.90*** 
(-4.19) 
(1) XHIGH 2.22* (1.75) [0.00] 
1.94 3,736 (2) XMED 2.77** (2.10) [0.05] 
(3) XLOW 2.43 (1.63) [0.04] 
        
Exports to 
US 
-4.99*** 
(-4.09) 
(1) XHIGH 2.94** (2.10) [0.02] 
1.99 3,688 (2) XMED 1.93 (1.31) [0.05] 
(3) XLOW 2.36* (1.70) [0.00] 
 
-continued in the next page- 
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TABLE 4 
 OTHER FACTORS OF INTERACTION 
-continued from previous page- 
 Si  Coefficient t-stat H0: 1+ 2/3/4=0 [p-value] R
2 (%) Obs. 
(b) financial integration proxies 
Bank -4.90*** (-4.17) 
(1) XHIGH 1.98 (1.54) [0.00] 
1.96 3,736 (2) XMED 2.77** (2.16) [0.06] 
(3) XLOW 3.35 (1.62) [0.20] 
        
Lending 
from US 
-4.77** 
(-3.18) 
(1) XHIGH 2.27 (1.33) [0.01] 
1.55 3,046 (2) XMED 2.88 (1.49) [0.19] 
(3) XLOW 1.96 (0.98) [0.06] 
        
FDI -4.67** (-2.39) 
(1) XHIGH 1.25 (0.65) [0.00] 
1.97 3,293 (2) XMED 2.83* (1.76) [0.08] 
(3) XLOW 2.72 (1.26) [0.10] 
        
FDI  
(US stock) 
-5.25*** 
(-4.70) 
(1) XHIGH 3.30*** (2.58) [0.02] 
2.24 3,608 (2) XMED 3.06** (2.18) [0.04] 
(3) XLOW 1.46 (1.11) [0.01] 
        
Portfolio 
Equity 
-4.90*** 
(-4.30) 
(1) XHIGH 1.82 (1.48) [0.00] 
1.97 3,736 (2) XMED 3.00** (2.20) [0.04] 
(3) XLOW 2.78 (1.53) [0.18] 
        
Portfolio 
Debt 
-4.90*** 
(-4.22) 
(1) XHIGH 2.22* (1.75) [0.00] 
1.95 3,736 (2) XMED 2.94** (2.11) [0.05] 
(3) XLOW 1.70 (0.93) [0.01] 
        
US equity 
investment 
-3.93** 
(-2.09) 
(1) XHIGH 1.60 (0.70) [0.09] 
1.20 2,066 (2) XMED 2.86 (1.16) [0.51] 
(3) XLOW 2.11 (0.94) [0.12] 
        
(c) Exchange rates flexibility 
        
XR Regime 
Classification 
-4.90*** 
(-4.20) 
(1) XFLEX 3.25** (2.18) [0.06] 1.97 3,736 (2) XFIXED 2.06* (1.69) [0.00] 
        
XR Volatility -4.30*** (-3.59) 
(1) XHIGH 0.60 (0.31) [0.01] 
1.99 3,568 (2) XMED 4.41*** (2.95) [0.91] 
(3) XLOW -0.90 (-0.54) [0.00] 
        
NOTES:  In this table we report results from the estimation of equation Eq. (6). This is a pooled regression of 
daily equity returns of 35 global equity price indices (r) on the market-based proxy for US monetary policy 
shocks (S) and 3 interactive terms on the 118 event days described in the main body of the text, and is written as 
follows: 
 
ij
HIGH
ij
SYN
iji
MED
ij
SYN
iji
LOW
ij
SYN
ijiiij XXSXXSXXSScr ,,,4,,3,,21, HEEEE  . 
 
XLOW, XMED, XHIGH are 0-1 dummy variables taking the value of 1 if country j at time i is among the one third of 
the countries from our sample which has the lowest/medium/highest value of the determinant shown in the first 
column of this Table, and zero otherwise. Detailed information about the dummy variables construction can be 
found in Table A.3 of the Appendix. The monetary policy synchronisation dummy XSYN takes the two alternative 
definitions which can be found in the main body of the text.  In column [p-value], we report the level of 
significance for the null hypothesis: H0: 1+ 2/3/4=0. Coefficient estimates are obtained by the OLS method, and 
t-statistics (.) in Panel A are calculated using the two-dimensional clustered standard errors of Petersen (2009), 
while in Panel B we report bootstrap t-statistics. 
 
*/**/*** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1  
POLICY RATE DATA 
Country Policy Rate Sample from 
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 
Australia Cash Rate Target 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Austria Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Belgium Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Brazil Selic Target Rate 07/1996 Δr < -0.75 -0.75 Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr  0.75 Δr > 0.75 
Canada Target Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Chile Central Bank of Chile Monetary Policy Rate 05/1995 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
China 1 year Major Loan Rate 01/1994 Δr < -0.75 -0.75  Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr  0.75 Δr > 0.75 
Czech Rep. 2 week Repo Rate 12/1995 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Denmark Discount rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Finland Official Base Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
France 
Average Cost Of Funds 
For Banks / Euro Repo 
Rate 
01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Germany Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Greece Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Hungary Central Bank Base Rate 01/1994 Δr < -0.75 -0.75  Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr  0.75 Δr > 0.75 
India Bank Rate 01/1994 Δr < -0.75 -0.75  Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr  0.75 Δr > 0.75 
Indonesia BI Rate 06/ 2005 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Ireland Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Israel Headline Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Italy Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Japan Overnight Call Money Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Luxembourg Discount Rate/Base Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Mexico CETE Rate 28 day 01/1994 Δr < -0.75 -0.75  Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr  0.75 Δr > 0.75 
Netherlands Credit Advances / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
New Zealand Official Cash Rate Target 03/1999 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Norway Sight Deposit Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Poland Reference Rate 02/1998 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Portugal Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Korea, Rep. Base Rate 05/1999 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Slovenia Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 10/2001 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
South Africa Discount Rate 01/1994 Δr < -0.75 -0.75  Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr  0.75 Δr > 0.75 
Spain Discount Rate / Short Term Euro Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Sweden Repo Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Switzerland 3-month Libor Target Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
Turkey Overnight Borrowing Rate 01/1994 Δr < -0.75 -0.75  Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr  0.75 Δr > 0.75 
U.K. Base Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
U.S. Federal Funds Target Rate 01/1994 Δr  -0.5 -0.5<Δr < 0 Δr = 0 0 < Δr < 0.5 Δr  0.5 
NOTES: For Euro area countries we use national policy rates until December 1998 (December 2000 for Greece and December 2006 for 
Slovenia), when these countries pursued their own monetary policy. After the introduction of the euro we use the policy rate set by the 
ECB. Until December 1998 L e b  e a  c  a e  e  b  the National Bank of Belgium.  
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TABLE A.2 
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF US MONETARY POLICY 
Country k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 
Australia -0.06 [0.08] 
-0.05 
[0.10] 
-0.07 
[0.24] 
0.14 
[0.05] 
0.04 
[0.15] 
Canada -0.11 [0.02] 
-0.34 
[0.00] 
0.10 
[0.14] 
0.24 
[0.00] 
0.11 
[0.01] 
Chile -0.11 [0.04] 
-0.26 
[0.03] - 
0.30 
[0.03] 
0.08 
[0.06] 
Denmark -0.20 [0.00] 
-0.22 
[0.00] 
0.01 
[0.98] 
0.35 
[0.00] 
0.06 
[0.10] 
Ireland -0.19 [0.10] 
-0.29 
[0.08] 
0.36 
[0.14] - 
0.12 
[0.21] 
Israel -0.19 [0.07] 
-0.16 
[0.08] 
0.15 
[0.08] 
0.10 
[0.09] 
0.09 
[0.09] 
Mexico -0.35 [0.01] 
-0.09 
[0.06] 
0.01 
[0.19] 
0.13 
[0.03] 
0.29 
[0.01] 
New Zealand -0.07 [0.11] 
-0.18 
[0.02] 
-0.28 
[0.05] 
0.45 
[0.00] 
0.08 
[0.11] 
Portugal -0.39 [0.04] 
-0.59 
[0.05] 
0.51 
[0.04] 
0.25 
[0.10] 
0.21 
[0.11] 
Korea, Rep. -0.02 [0.36] 
-0.13 
[0.12] 
-0.05 
[0.50] 
0.20 
[0.09] - 
Slovenia -0.31 [0.09] 
-0.30 
[0.12] 
0.40 
[0.13] 
0.16 
[0.16] 
0.06 
[0.36] 
Spain -0.35 [0.04] 
-0.63 
[0.03] 
0.87 
[0.02] 
0.05 
[0.38] 
0.07 
[0.33] 
Switzerland -0.16 [0.02] 
-0.01 
[0.35] 
-.006 
[0.91] 
0.12 
[0.03] 
0.05 
[0.08] 
U.K. -0.04 [0.14] 
-0.37 
[0.00] 
-0.02 
[0.87] 
0.38 
[0.00] 
0.05 
[0.12] 
Euro Area -0.11 [0.06] 
-0.09 
[0.09] 
-0.24 
[0.08] 
0.39 
[0.00] 
0.04 
[0.22] 
NOTES: This table shows the marginal effects of yt from the ordered probit model in Eq. (4) and 
the corresponding level of significance [.]. Marginal effects are calculated only for those 
countries whose policy rates are more likely to adjust their policy rates in the same direction as 
e Fede a  Re e e  c  a e, a  e  a e bee  de ed  Tab e 2.   
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TABLE A.3 
DATA APPENDIX 
Dummy Variable Definition 
  
Trade (row) / 
 Exports to the US 
  
 
0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (XLOW/XMED /XHIGH) level of trade 
with the rest of the world / exports to the US as a percentage of their GDP, and zero otherwise. 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a percentage of GDP. 
[Source: World bank; IMF Direction of Trade Statistics; annual frequency] 
  
FDI / FDI (US stock) 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (XLOW/XMED /XHIGH) level of foreign 
direct investment positions (outward + inward) / US direct investment position as a percentage of 
their GDP, and zero otherwise. [OECD; annual frequency] 
  
Bank  0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample whose banks have the lowest/medium/highest (XLOW/XMED /XHIGH) 
level of external positions (assets and liabilities) with the rest of the world, and zero otherwise. 
[BIS locational banking statistics Table 6A;quarterly frequency] 
  
Portfolio Equity 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (XLOW/XMED /XHIGH) level of 
reported equity portfolio investments (assets + liabilities) to and from the rest of the world, and 
zero otherwise. For missing years 1994-1996 we use the 1997 data, and for 1998-2000 the 2001 
data. [IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey; annual frequency]. 
  
Portfolio Debt 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (XLOW/XMED /XHIGH) level of 
reported debt portfolio investments (assets + liabilities) to and from the rest of the world, and zero 
otherwise. For missing years 1994-1996 we use the 1997 data, and for 1998-2000 the 2001 data. 
[IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey; annual frequency]. 
  
US equity  
investment 
0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (XLOW/XMED /XHIGH) level of US 
equity portfolio investments as a percentage of their market capitalisation, and zero otherwise. 
[IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, World Bank; annual frequency].  
  
XR Regime 
Classification 
Using the de facto classification of the exchange regime by Ilzetzki et al. (2010) we define a 0-1 
dummy variable XFLEX taking the value of 1 if country j at time i has a flexible exchange rate 
regime (classification 3 or 4) , and zero otherwise (classification 1 or 2). Analogously XFIXED is a 0-
1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 if country j at time i has a less flexible exchange rate 
regime (classification 1 or 2), and zero otherwise (classification 3 or 4). 
  
XR Regime Volatility 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (XLOW/XMED /XHIGH) daily exchange 
rate changes standard deviation (against the US dollar), and zero otherwise. [WM/Reuters closing 
spot rates] 
  
Lending from US 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of 
the countries from our sample with the highest amount of lending from the US banking system, 
and zero otherwise. [BIS consolidated banking statistics Table 9B; quarterly frequency] 
 
